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AGING AND lABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND EXPLANATIONS
by
Robin L. Lunisdajne and David A. Wise*
The American population is aging rapidly. Persons 65 and over whonow
constitute about one-fifth of the population will constitute about two-fifths
of the population by 2040. In addition, individuals are living longer. Yet
the labor force participation of older Americans has fallen dramatically in
recent years. This paper discusses this trend and the principal explanations
put forth to explain it. The paper is in two parts. The first part review.
trends in labor force participation and associated trends in Social Security
(SS) coverage, firm pension plan coverage, and other factors that are likely
to be associated with the labor force participation trends. The secondpart
of the paper discusses the incentive affects of SS and retirement plans, with
emphasis on firm pension plans. The intent is to summarize the facts and the
research that has attempted to explain them. The presentation is primarily
graphical. We begin with a simple conceptual framework.
I.A Cpncetup1 Framework.
To help to organize the discussion that follows and to put the idea. in
context, a conceptual framework of the retirement decision isoutlinedin
*We have paraphrased and borrowedfreely from papers by Kotlikoff and
Vise [1985, 1987, 1989] and Stock and Wise [1988, 1989]. Data gathered by
several other authors have also been used, often in a format different from
the original author's presentation. In all cases theoriginal sources are
cited.
Financial support was provided by the National Institute on Aging,grant
numbers P01 AG05842 and T32 AG00186, and by the Hoover Institution.(2)
figure 1, which summarizes several stylized facts.1 Several factors have
important influences on the retirement decision as workers age. As health and
functional ability deteriorate, the disutility of work increases and the
relative desire for leisure increases, indicated by the line labelled L in the
figure. Real wage earnings typically rise over some portion of the working
life, but later decline with age, as indicated by .I.Lower wage earnings and
greater hardship associated with working tend to increas, theincentiveto
retire. As employees age they may also accumulate more personal saving and
their sntitl.ment to SS and firm pension benefits increases. Thus if the
utirenta,e ipLoued, loyees ar abld to uppot. highlev1of
consumption after retirement. In addition, any given level of personal saving
or SS and pension entitlement can support a higher annual consumption level if
rstirsm.nt is postponed; there are few.r remaining years of lifeover which
support must be provided. This is summarized asBin the figure. The larger
thus. benefits, the greater the incentive to retire.
The central theme of the discussion below is the upward shiftover time
in the relationship between benefits andage; given age, SS and pension
entitlements have increased. Thus the incentive to retire has increased.
With respect to most of the discussion below, itmay be assumed that the
relationship between real wage earnings and age, and the relationship between
the disutility of work (desire for leisure) andage, have not changed over
time.
Worker productivity also declines withage. It is often argued that
productivity is greater than the wage early in theworkinglife and less than
1Patterned after Fig. 10.1 inNalebuff and Zeckhauser [1985}.(3)












the wage later in the working life. This is the assumption reflected in the
relationship between worker productivity, F, and the wage shown in the figure.
This relationship is often put forth as an explanation for the structure of
private pension plans, that typically encourage early retirement, as discussed
below.
II. Life Expectancy. Labor FQrce Participation, and Associated Trends.
A. Life Expectancy and the Ase Composition of the U.S. Population.
Americans are living longer and the proportion of the population that is
old is increasing rapidly. In 1950, for example, the annual death rate of
white men 75 to 79 was 90.1 per 1,000; by 1980 it had fallen to 80.7, a 10
percent reduction. Assuming current trends, the projected death rate for the
year 2000 is 63.9, a further 21 percent reduction. The reductions for white
women are even larger, as shown in figure 2.2
An implication of the lower death rates is a marked increase in life
expectancy, especially for women. Men who were 65 in 1950 could expect to
live 12.8 more years; in 1980 they could expect to live 14.2 more years, an 11
percent increase. (See figure 3a.) Over the same thirty-year period, the
life expectancy of women who were 65 increased by over 23 percent, from 15 to
18.5. (See figure 3b.)
The overall aging of the population probably has more important policy
implications than increasing individual life expectancy. The proportion of
2These date were taken from Poterba and Summers [1987], who obtained
their data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National

































































































































































































































































































































the population 55 and over has increased from about 15 percent in 1940 to
about 21 percent in 1980. By 2020 almost 31 percent of the population will
be in this age group.(See figure 4a.) The elderly (those over 54), who now
constitute about one-fifth of all adults, will constitute about two-fifths of
all adults by 2040.
Th. oldest age groups are growing the fastest. Only 0.3 percent of the
population was over 85 in 1940; the proportion had increased to 1.0 percent by
1980, mostly since 1960. (See figure 4b.) The projected proportion is 2.4 in
2020. The proportion between 65 and 74 increased from about 5 percent of the
populMtion in 1940 to close to 7 percent in 1980; the 2020 projection is 10
percent. Thus an increasingly large fraction of the population is older than
typical retirement ages. As emphasized below, the dramatic reduction in
retirement ages magnifies this effect.
From the point of view of the individual, increasing life expectancy
induces later retirement. If other factors remain the same, longer life
expectancy means that any given level of pension and SS entitlement, or of
personal saving, must be used to support consumption over more retirement
years. From the point of view of society, a larger older population means
that a smaller labor force must support a larger number of retirees.
B. Labor Force Parttcioatjpn.
Although a larger and larger fraction of the population is old and
individual life expectancy is increasing, workers are leaving the labor force
at younger and younger ages. Thus there are more older people, living longer,
working less.
A recent study of Ransom and Sutch 11988] shows that the labor force


















































































































































































































































































































































































































1930. Indeed for most older age groups, the rates in 1937 wereessentially
the same as in 1930, according to their study. Since that time the labor
force participation rates of older men have fallen continuously. Adjusted for
the shift away from agricultural employment, the rate increased from a little
over 50 percent in 1870 to almost 65 percent in 1930 and then fell to about 30
percent by 1980. Social Security was introduced under the Social Security Act
of 1935. Company pensions were spurred by the Revenue Act of 1942, that
granted tax incentives to firms to establish pension plans. The Ransom and
Sutch data, based on the decennial censuses, are reproduced In figure Sa.
These data, as reported in Sandefur and Tuisa (l98fl, also have been used
to construct labor force participation rates by age group for men and women at
10 year intervals, beginning in 1940. (See figures Sb through 5d.)3 The
rates for men fell in each age group. For example, 61.4 percent of men 55 and
over were in the labor force in 1940, by 1970 the proportion had fallen to
3Sandefur and Tuma [19871. Labor forceparticipation by gender and age
group can be computed from Sandefur and Tuma's tables 1, 2, 3, and 10. For
example, the labor force participation of men in a given age category is equal
to the percentage of men in that age group that are employed divided by the
percentage of men in that age group (which is given in table 3, panel a).
Since the tables are divided by gender and race simultaneously, thepercentage
of employed men in a given age group is the percentage of white employed men
in that age group plus the percentage of nonwhite employed men in thatage
group. For each race, the percentage of employed men in an age group is the
product of the following: the percentage of men of a given race and age that
is employed, the percentage of the population of a given race andage that is
male, the percentage of a given age that is a specific race. These are
obtained from tables 10, 3, and 2 respectively. To aggregateage groups,
additional information regarding the percentage of the population that is a














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































52.7, by 1985 only 39.6 percent of men in this age group were in the labor
force. The participation rates of women 55 and over increased until 1970.
But .ince 1970, even the rates for women have fallen.(See figure 5b.)
Indeed for both men and women there was an abrupt change in labor force
participation rates in the early 1970's: for men the reduction was
accelerated in most age groups and for women the rates that had been
increasing began to decline.
C. Associated Trends.
What has enabled people to leave the labor force at younger and younger
ages and still maintain consumption after retirement? It seems evident that
this has been made possible by Social Security benefits and by firm pension
plans. Before discussing trends in SS and pension coverage, it is useful to
establish first that support in old age is typically not financed by personal
saving.
1. The Composition of Total Wealth.
Based on the recent Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
Venti and Wise [19891 have computed the composition of total wealth for all
households, for homeowners, and for renters in 1984. The results are
summarized in figures 6a, 6b, and 6c. The amounts reflect median wealth by
asset category. It is clear from figure 6a that most families approach
retirement age with very little personal saving other than housing equity.
For example, among households with heads 60 to 65. the median of liquid wea1th
is only $6.6 thousand; the median of housing equity is $43.0 thousand.4
4Liquid wealth is broadly defined to include interest earning assets held
in banks and other institutions, mortgages held, money owed from sale of
businesses, U.S. Savings Bonds, and checking accounts, equity in stocks and










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The majority of families rely heavily on Social Security (SS) benefits
for support after retirement, and to a more limited extent on the saving that
is done for them by employers, through defined benefit pension plans. The
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data, from which these
figures were computed, allow estimation of the value of SS and pension plan
benefits only after the payments are received.5 Thus wealth in the form of SS
and pensions is only recorded for persons who have begun to receive the
payments. Most persons have retired by 65 and thereafter are receiving the
benefits to which they are entitled. About 59 percent of householda with
reference persons between 65 and 70 receive pension benefits; R9 percent
receive SS benefits. The present value of pension and 55 wealth is based on
life tables together with the amount of the annual payments. Social Security
benefits are indexed to inflation; private pension benefits typically are
not.6 As can be seen from figure 6a, SS and pension wealth is by far the most
important component of the wealth of most elderly. Among households with
heads 65 to 70, for example, the median of 55 and pension wealth combined is
$113.4 thousand; the median of housing wealth is $38.0 thousand and the median
of liquid financial assets is only $10.0 thousand. The decline in 55 and
5The SIPP data do not contain SSearnings histories (that determine 55
benefits), nor do they contain detailed pension plan provisions.
6The present values of pension and SS benefitsare the discounted
survival weighted streams of income from each source received by the reference
person and the spouse if present. Discounting is at 6 percent and survival
probabilities are calculated from mortality tables by sex. Payments from S5,
military pensions, federal employee pensions, and the railroad retirement
pension are assumed to be indexed at an annual rate of 4 percent. All other
sources of pension income are not indexed in the wealth calculations.(21)
pension wealth with age is largely an artifact of declining life expectancy,
The lower housing equity of older households is a cohort effect and does not
reflect a teduction of housing equity as individual households age; in fact,
housing equity increases on average as the elderly age; there is little change
in housing equity even among families that move from one home ro another.
Comparison of figures Lb and Lc shows that households who rent have
substantially less wealth than homeowners in all asset categories. The median
total wealth of homeowners is $L70.4 thousand; the median for renters is $59.3
thousand. Renters, who comprise about 20 percent of all households, have
virtually no liquid assets.
In summary: the majority of elderly hnuseholds live on Social Security
and pension benefits.
2. Social Security Coverage.
It is clear from figure 5a that the trend to earlier retirement began
between the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 and the Revenue Act of
1942. The 1942 Revenue Act granted tax incentives to firms to establish
pension plans. Indeed, after adjusting for the reduction in agricultural
employment, there was a sharp reversal In the prior trend to later retirement,
as shown by Ransom and Sutch 11988].
The percent of persons 65 and over receiving SS benefits increased from
about 20 percent in 1940 to 85 percent in 1960; now about 95 percent receive
SS benefits.(See figure 7.) In addition, the level of benefits has
increased sharply. The benefits for a retired male worker increased from
about 14 percent of median male income in 1950 to 37.5 percent in l980. Thus





































































































































































































































not only has coverage been extended to virtually the entire labor force, but
the standard of living that the benefits can support has also increased
sharply.
3. Firm Pension Plans.
The proportion of the workforce covered by a firm(ora federal or state
or local government) pension plan Increased from 23.8 to 48.6 percent between
1950 and 1979. Now about 50 percent of the workforce is covered by a pension
plan. Most of the growth in pension coverage occurred in the 1950s. The
proportion of the older poulatipn (55 and over) collecting pension benefits
continues to increase, as shown in figure 8. Zy 1984, 30.8 percent of persons
55 and over, and 39.0 percent of persons 65 and over were collecting pension
benefits from some source, according to the SIP?.
In short: It is evident that the expansion of SS and firm pension plans
has allowed and encouraged earlier retirement. In addition to the incoma
incentive created by the entitlement to retirement income, the discussion
below shows that the timing of the accrual of pension entitlements, created by
firm pension plan provisions in particular, provides a strong incentive to
retire early. These provisions create large increases and decreases in the
total compensation from working at particular ages. Thus the retirement
benefit inducement to retire results from both income and price (wage)
effects.
4. Earnings of Older Employees.
Like the earnings of younger employees, the earnings of older workers
increased consistently from 1940 to 1970. But after 1970, the earnings of the
oldest employees began to decline, and the earnings of all older workers were

































































































































































































































































































































































































































earnings of employees 65 to 69 were about the same in real terms as they were
25 years earlier, in 1960. The 1985 earnings of employees 55 to 59 were lower
than they were in 1970. These data may be affected by selective retirement of
the highest paid employees and by part-time work, but there is ample evidence
of a general decline in real wages across all age groups in the United States
since about 1972. Thus falling real wage earnings may also have contributed
to earlier retirement in recent years.
5. The Income of the Elderly.
Although the labor force participation rates of older Americans have
fallen dramatically in recent years, the average income of the elderly has
increased sharply. Income data have been tabulated by Hurd and Shoven (1982)
for several years between 1963 and 1978.8 (See figures lOa and lob.) Between
1960 and 1980, the labor force participation rates of men 65 and older fell by
37.5 percent. from 31.7 to 19.8. Yet the incomes of the elderly increased
more than three fold over approximately the same time period. The proportion
of income from earnings declined, while the proportion from SS, firm pension
benefits, and government medical plans increased substantially. The Hurd and
Shoven computations include an estimate for the user Cost of housing and an
estimate for the income equivalent of Medicare and Medicaid insurance (valued
at cost). According to their numbers, the proportion of the income of the
elderly derived from their own earnings declined from 29 to 18 percent between
1963 and 1978. Over the same period the proportion from SS, firm pension
plans, and government medical insurance increased from 32 to 51 percent. The
8The Hurd and Shoven data are based on several U.S. Bureau of the Census
and U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security

































































































































































































































































































































proportion of income from assets remained roughly constant. The I-1urd and
Shoven data are based on income by category. Data by Venti and Wise,
based on median income by category, make it clear that the vast majority of
the income of most elderly families comes from Social Security and pension
benefits. (See figures 6a-6c above.)
6. Personal Savjnz.
Change. in personal saving may also affect retirement decisions.
Personal saving declined from 3 to 6 percent of disposable private income in
the 1950. to around 1 percent in the early l980s, based on computations made
hy Sutnm.ra and Carroll [1987] and reproduced in figure 11. These numbers are
adjusted for inflation and exclude saving by employers through defined benefit
pension plans.9 Without the inflation adjustment, the downward trend begins
only after 1973.It is clear from papers by Venti and Wise [1987, 1989], for
example, that there is a very large range in personal saving rates, with a
large proportion of the population saving virtually nothing except in the form
of hou.ing equity. Thus the extent to which the aggregate data reflect a
reduction in saving that could impinge on the retirement decisions of an
important proportion of employees is not clear. In any case, less personal
saving, holding other income sources Constant, would typically be associated
with later retirement, clearly not the dominant force in the current trend.
7. Summary.
The trends discussed above are summarized In Figure 12. The labor force
participation of older Americans has declined dramatically since 1940. Social
9The National Income Accounts include firm contributions to defined
benefit pension plans under "personal saving." Inflation adjusted saving is




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Security and pension benefits have become the major source of income for the
majority of older persons, and the total income of persons over 65 has
increased enormously, over three fold between 1963 and 1978 alone. (Real
annual earnings of the typical employee are about the same now as they were in
the •arly 1960..) These forces have clearly dominated longer life expectancy
and lower p.r.onal saving that would be expected to prolong labor force
participation. In addition, a fall in real wages since 1970 may have
contributed to earlier retirement in more recent years. Without some change
in labor force participation rate. of older persons, the prospect is that a
smaller s.g.nt of working persona will support an increasingly larger group
of retire...
III. The Incentive Effects of Public and Private Retirement Plans.
Tb. foregoing discussion highlights the correlates of the reduction in
the labor force participation rates of older Americans, and suggests the
conclusion that the reduction was induced by the introduction of SS and firm
pension plans. The implication is that the adoption of public and private
entitlements to retirement benefits made early retirement possible; it
increased the income available to support retirement consumption. The
discussion below emphasizes the incentive effects inherent in the provisions
of public and private plans, independent of the retirement wealth that they
represent.
The 1980s have witnessed a marked shift in government policy toward
promoting the labor supply of the elderly. The government has virtually
eliminated mandatory retirement and it has scheduled a gradual increase in the
Social Security retirement age from 65 to 67. It has limited somewhat the(33)
Social Security earnings test that reduces Social Security benefits for
"retired" workers earning more than an "exempt amount;" iteliminatedthe
arnings test after age 70. and it is increasing the actuarial incentive to
delay the receipt of Social Security benefits beyond age 65.
The change in the government policy is responsive to the major
demographic swing that is underway and its important implications for
retirement finances in the next century. Given Social Security's pay-as-you-
go method of finance, the projected increase in the ratio of beneficiaries to
contributors means either significant cuts in future benefits or significant
future increases in the Social Security payroll tax.
Reversing the trend toward early retirement represents an important
alternative for addressing the demographic transition. Additional labor
supply of the elderly would relieve Social Security's finances as well as
offset a potential shortage in the supply of labor relative to that of other
productive factors. In addition, it is argued that for many elderly
prolonging their labor force participation would mean more fulfilling lives.
What has gone largely unrecognizeo is that, notwithstanding recent
changes in Social Security regulations intended to prolong work, private
pension plan provisions operate powerfully in the opposite direction. The
most prominent theoretical explanations for the firm behavior rest on the
proposition that the efficient structure of the age-wage profile is such that
older workers are paid more than their worth to the firm and must therefore be
encouraged to retire. (See Lazear [1979), for example.) Whether this is in
fact the reason has not been demonstrated. Conversations with pension
managers reveal that in some instances the incentives of the plans are not
fully understood and many plans have been introduced without consideration of(34)
their effects on retirement. Some special early retirement incentives
(temporary "window" plans) have been introduced to relieve the firm of older
workers so that younger workers could be promoted, or simply as a means of
reducing the size of the firm's workforce.
Many researchers have pointed to the Social Security system's high
benefit levels and work disincentives as a major contributor to the continuing
trend towards early retirement and a great deal of research has focused on the
effect of Social Security benefits on labor force participation. Recent
examples are blinder, Gordon and Wise (1980], Burkhauser (19801, Hurd and
Boskin (1981], Burkhauser and Quinn [1983], Zurtless and Moffitt (1984],
Hausman and Wise [1985], Burtless (1986], and Gustman and Steinmeier (1986].
With few exceptions -Hurdand Boskin [19811 and, to some extent, Hausman and
Wise (1985] -- thesestudies attribute only a modest portion of the early
retirement trend to the effect of Social Security provisions, although the
findings may reflect, to some degree, problems of misspecificatton in
accounting for its effects. In contrast, there has been very little work
relating retirement behavior to the retirement incentives provided by pension
plans)0 The apparent reason for this neglect has been the difficulty in
obtaining data that combine the retirement choices of older workers with
information about their past earnings and the specific provisions of their
pension plansj1
10The most closely related work considers the effect of pension planson
job mobility (Clark and McDermed [1987), Gustman and Steinmeier [1987], Allen,
Clark, and McDermed [1987), and Allen, Clark, and McDermed [1988]), but not
retirement.
11Exceptjons are gurkhauser [1979], Fields and Mitchell [1982], Lazear
(1983), Kotlikoff and Wise [1987], and Hogarth [1988).(35)
More recent work of Kotlikoff and Wise [1985, 1987. 19891. Stock and Wise
(1988, 19891, and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise [1989) suggests that the
provisions of private pension plans are typically much more important than SS
provisions as determinants of the retirement behavior of workers covered by
such plans. Their detailed analysis of the provisions of private defined
benefit pension plans, which account for roughly three quarters of all pension
plan recipients, indicates that a large proportion of these plans provide very
large incentives to retire early. Virtually all defined benefit plans
incorporate stiff financial penalties for working past the age of 65. and a
very sizable fraction have similarly stiff penalties for working past the
plan's early retirement age, often as young as 55.Similar evidence is
presented by Bulow (1981], Lazear [1983], Clark and McDermad [1984), Fields
and Mitchell [19841, and Frant and Leonard [19871. Working an additional
year often involves losing, in expected present value of future pension
benefits, an amount equivalent to half a year's non-penaion earnings, if not
more. These retirement incentives in many, if not most, instances are
significantly greater than those ascribed to Social Security.
We consider first the incentive effects inherent in the SS rules,and then
the incentive effects of private pension plans.
A. Social Security.
The SS benefit amount is based on past individual earnings, although the
relationship between benefits and earnings is not linear. Benefits are a much
larger proportion of the past earnings of low-wage than of high-wage workers.
The initial benefit is based on nominal earnings indexed toage 60 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). After retirement (receipt of benefits),
the benefits are indexed to the CPI. The SS normal retirementage is 65. But(36)
benefits can be taken as young as 62, with the benefit amount actuarially
reduced to reflect the increase in the expected number of retirement years
over which benefits will be received. That is, if the benefit entitlement is
not changed because of a change in earnings, the expected present value of
futur. benefits is the sam. irrespective of the age, between 62 and 65, at
which the benefits are first received. After age 65, however, the increase in
the b.nefits is much less than actuarial, It is now 3 percent per year, but
was only one percent per year until 1981.12
The easiest way to understand the incentive effects of the benefit
structure is to consider the relationship between the present value of future
benefits and the age of retirement. Such relationships are shown in figures
13a for two representative workers, one a low-wage and the other a high-wage
•mployee. The top part of the graph represents nominal earnings by age (age
50 earnings are in 1980 dollars). The bottom part of the graph represents the
accrual of SS wealth (SSW). it is the change in the present value of SS
benefits between one year and the next. That is, SSAt —SSW
-SSWt1(i+r).
where in this case r is a nominal discount rate taken to be 9 percent. Thus
the figure represents two forms of compensation: one is wage earnings, the
other is the increase in the entitlement to future SS benefits.
Social Security accrual is a small proportion of wage earnings for the
high-wage worker, but can be a significant proportion for the low-wage worker,
as shown in figure l3b. It is about 6 percent of the wage earnings of the
low-wage worker at age 50 and increases to almost 10 percent at age 62.If
12Although the change from 1 percent to 3 percent was the result ofa
1977 law, it applied to those who would be 65 in 1981 and later years.(37)
Figure 13a. Social Security accrual and earnings,









































































































































































































































































































































the low-wage worker continues to work from 62 to 65, the accrual isneaatiye,
(10% of the wage at 64). The .1Q in the present value of SS benefits would
be about 39 percent of wage earnings if the person continued to workpast age
65. Thus the reduction in total wage and SS compensation between 62 and 66
would be about 50 percent, were the low-wage worker to continue to work. The
reduction in total compensation for the high wage worker would be about 14
percent. Thus the SS inducement to leave the labor force at age 65 is
inversely related to wage earnings.
B. Firm Pensions.
Roughly three quarters of all persons participating in private pension
plans are enrolled in defined benefit plans where benefits are determined
according to a specified formula. The remainder are enrolled in plans where
benefits are directly related to contributions made on behalf of the employee
and to the performance of the plan's investment portfolio. Because most
workers are covered by defined benefit plans and because they are likely to
have the greatest effects on labor market behavior, the discussion here
emphasizes the incentive effects of this type of plan. The evidence is
presented in three sections. The first section discusses the "average"
incentives of a large number of plans. The second section discusses the
incentives of the plan of a single large firm and relates these incentives to
departure rates from the firm. The third section discusses a new econometric
model of retirement and simulations based on the model.
1. The Incentive Effects of Typical Plans.
Kotlikoff and Wise [1985 and 19871 considered the retirement incentive
effects inherent in typical defined benefit plans and have analyzed the
provisions of a large number of firm plans. As with Social Security, it is(40)
easiest to exhibit the potential retirement incentive effects of defined
benefit pension plans by describing the accrual of vested benefits.Figure 14
istaken from Kotlikoff and Wise [19871.It shows the average accrual rates
(weighted by plan membership) for U.S. defined benefit plans with selected
early and normal retirement ages. The pension accrual in a year is the
increase (or decrease) in the expected discounted value of futurepension
benefits that results from working that year. It is the value of deferred
compensation analogous to current wage compensation. Pension accrual is shown
as a percent of wage compensation (the accrual ratio or accrual rate). The
data come from a randon sarnplc of approximately 2500 plans from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Level of Benefits Survey.13 For each plan, accrualrates are
calculated assuming average wage-tenure profiles in the industry and
occupation to which the plan pertains, based on current populationsurvey
data. 14
Consider first plans with early and normal retirement at thesante age,
55. a plan stipulation that is common in the transportationindustry, for
example. The average decline in the rate of pension wealth accrual at 55 is
equivalent to about 30 percent of wage earnings. If the typicalperson
covered by such a plan were to continue to work throughage 65, pension
accrual would be negative and equivalent to approximately 30percent of wage
earnings. Whereas at age 54 the pension benefit accrual Is equivalent to
about 30 percent of wage earnings, afterage 65 continued work means a loss in
'3Similar calculations have been madeby Lazear [1983] based on the
Bankers Trust Survey of large pension plans.
































































































































































































































































pension wealth equivalent to about 30 percent of wage earnings. Thus, between
these two ages, the decline in the rate of pension wealth accrual is
equivalent to a 60 percent wage reduction!
The more common plans with early retirement at 55 and normalretirement
at 65 typically exhibit an increase in pension wealth accrual toage 55 with a
decline thereafter. Again, continued work pastage 65 is associated with a
substantial loss in pension wealth, with the decline in accrualequivalent to
approximately 20 percent of wage earnings. The pension wealth ofpersons
covered by plans with early and normal retirement both at 65 increases
continuously until 65 and then declines by approximately 60 percent, froma
positive accrual of about 21 percent of salary to a negative accrual of about
19 percent.
Thus, based on industry wide earnings profiles, continuedemployment with
the plan sponsor after the age of early retirementand, in particular, after
the age of normal retirement1 typically involvesa substantial reduction in
total annual compensation because of declines inpension wealth accrual.
While figure 14 highlights theaverage characteristics of plans, it is
important to understand that there is avery wide range in plan provisions,
even among plans with the same early and normal retirementages. This is
demonstrated in figure 15. also taken from Kotlikoffand Wise [1987J. The
figure shows average accrual rates for the 513 plans offigure 14 with early
retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65,together with upper and lower 5
percentile levels. The lower S percentile points forany age group is that
accrual rate such that 5 percent of plans have accrualsbelow the level. The
upper S percentile point is defined analogously. Consider theaccrual ratio






































































































































































































































































































































median .021, the maximum is .383, and the minimum is zero. The ratio at the
lowest five percentile point is 0, while it is .201 at the largest five
percentile level. A similarly large dispersion in annual accrual ratios is
Indicated for each of the ages 40 through 70. The average accrual rates
between ages 55 and 65 are positive, but for many plans the rates by 65 are
very negative.
Thus while the average plan may provide positive pension accrual at a
particular age, the accrual rate may be substantially negative for some plans.
Even a small proportion of plans that provide a strong incentive to leave the
labor force could have a very substantial effect on observed average labor
force participation rates. Thus it is important to base judgments about the
labor force participation incentive effects of pension plans on more than
average accrual rates.
2. The Plan of a Large Firm.
Whether incentive effects like those described above have an effect on
retirement decisions is a second question. Rotlikoff and Wise [1985, 19891
have addressed this question by considering the relationship between pension
plan provisions and retirement rates in a large Fortune 500 fIrm. That work
Is summarized in this section. The analysis of the firm data shows avery
strong relationship between the plan provisions and departure rates from the
fi nil.
a.The Plan. The plan normal retirement age is 65; the early
retirement age Is 55. Vesting occurs after 10 years of service. The plan is
Integrated with Social Security, so that the benefits are reduced (offset) by
some proportion of SS benefits. Figure 16a summarizes the incentive effects
inherent in the plan provisions. The figure shows the pension accrual between(45)
Figure 16a. Wage earnings, pension accrual,
and Social Security accrual,
representative person in Firm I.
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ages 50 and 70 of male managers hired by the firmin1960, at age 30. By
1980. they were 50 and had 20 years of service with the firm. The accrual of
Social Security benefits and predicted wage earnings for each year are also
shown. The wage predictions are based on actual average earnings of firm
employees. All of the numbers are In real 1985 dollars.
At age SO, the typical male manager has wage earnings of about $48,446
per year. Compensation in the form of pension accrual is $2,646, or about 6
percent of wage earnings. If the manager were to retire at this age, he would
be entitled to benefits at 65, based on his earnings in the seven or eight
precedIng years. The benefits wouhi not be available until age 65, and thus
have a relatively low present value at age 50. Normal retirement benefits
could be taken earlier, as early as age 55, but they would be reduced
actuarially such that the present discounted value of the benefits remains
unchanged. The reduction in the benefit would be just enough to offset the
fact that benefits would be received for more years)5
If the person remains in the firm until age 55 and then retires, however,
benefits are available immediately, and the reduction in benefits for early
retirement is less than the actuarial reduction. In addition, the worker who
remains until age 55 and then retires is eligible to receive a supplemental
benefit until age 65 equal to his Social Security offset. Thus there is a
very large increase in pension wealth at age 55, $72,527, corresponding to the
large spike in the graph. In effect, there is a bonus of $72,527 for
remaining in the firm from age 54 to 55.
15Not accounting for any real rate of time preference.(48)
After age 55, pension accrual falls to about 10 percent of thewage at
age 60.16 Pension accrual is in fact negative beginning at age 61. The loss
in compensation between ages 60 and 61 is equivalent to a wage cut of about 16
percent. Between ages 61 and 65 the loss in pension benefits is equivalent to
about 20 percent of annual wage compensation. If the worker has 30 or more
years of service at age 60, he is eligible for full retirement benefits; the
early retirement reduction factors no longer apply.'7
Social Security accruals range from about $1,000 to $8,000 betweenage 50
and 65. After 65, Social Security accrual becomes negative, about -$8,500 at
age 66. At 66, the loss in private pension benefits and Social Security
benefits together amounts to about 32 percent of wage earnings at thatage.
(For some groups of employees in the firm, the loss in pension and Social
Security wealth together after age 65 is equivalent to 95 percent ofwage
earnings: if these employees continue to work, it is essentially without
compensation.)
'6The plan provisions stipulate thatan additional year of service adds 2
percent to normal retirement benefits per year of service beforeage 55, but
only j percent per year of service after age 55.
'7Thus no increase in benefits willresult for working another year from
the application of one less year of early retirementreduction, as was the
case before 30 years of service. In addition, for eachyear that benefits are
not taken between ages 55 and 65, the receipt of benefits fora year without
the Social Security offset (reduction) is foregone. Thisadvantage is lost at
age 65. Thereafter, the loss in benefits from working an additionalyear is
smaller because this opportunity is no longer available; itwas only available
until age 65. The accruals also depend to a small extenton the updating of
the years used in the calculation of "final"earnings. "Final" earnings are
used to determine the pension benefit.(49)
The datainfigure 16a are shown in the standard budget constraint form
in figure 16b. Total compensation, including wage earnings, Social Security
wealth, and pension wealth, is graphed against age, beginning at age 50.
There is a discontinuous jump in the graph at age 55, the age at which early
retirement benefits are available on an advantageous basis.
b.The Firm Departure Rates. Departure rates by age and years of
service suggest the effect of pension plan provisions on retirement. They are
shownforsalesmen by age and years of service in table 1 below.
Table 1. Departure Rates for Salesmen by Aae and Years of Service
Years of Service
<1011-15 16-2021-2526-3031-35 36+
<50 19 9 5 4 3 .- --
50-54 14 7 4 3 3 2 0
55 11 14 9 11 12 15 --
56-59 14 13 9 11 11 14 --
60 11 12 16 19 14 29 35
61 13 12 13 13 19 32 28
62 12 27 32 38 36 52 35
63 20 28 33 36 47 48 56
64 0 37 36 30 36 38 28
65 36 56 51 50 49 47 43
66 17 28 10 34 18 16 12
67 20 16 25 21 8 5 18
The yearly departure rate is the proportion of those employed at the beginning
of the year that retires -- morestrictly speaking, leaves the firm -- during
the forthcoming year. Several aspects of the data stand out: (1) Before 55
departure rates are typically around 3 percent for vested employees; they are
substantially larger for those with less than ten years of service, who are(50)
not vested. At 55, the early retirement age, they jump to 10 percent or more,
but only for vested employees, those with at least 10 years of service. It is
important to notice that the departure rates stay at that level until age 60,
when there Is another jump in the rate of departure. (2) At age 60, the
departure rates increase very precipitously especially for persons with over
30 years service. For this group full benefits are available because there is
no longer an early retirement reduction according to the plan's rules. For
this group subsequent pension accrual is negative. (3) When Social Security
benefits become available at 62, the departure rates again increase very
sharply, but only for those who are vested in the firm plan.(4) Finally,
there is a large increase in departure rates at 65, the SS normal retirement
age. Roth pension and SS accruals are negative if the employee continues to
work beyond age 65.
To understand the potential importance of the early retirement benefits,
suppose that if it were not for this inducement, the departure rates would
remain at 3 percent until age 60 instead of the 10 or 12 percent rates that
are observed. Departure at 3 percent per year means that 14 percent of those
who were employed at 55 would have left before age 60;at 11 percent per
year, 44 percent would leave between 55 and 59.
Cumulative departure rates for all employees are shown in table 2 below
for three years, together with the rates byage. The cumulative rates are one
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then about 50 percent of these
These data also show the
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Table 2. Cumulative and Yearly Departure Rates
by Calendar Year. Years of Service, and Ae
Yearly ___________
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65 25 53 5845
a show the percent still
1983 departure rates, only 48
employed at 60, and then 17
would remain until age 65, and
effect of a special early retirement incentive
effect in 1982 only. For employees who were
in 1982, the incentive program provided a bonus
tisclear that the effect of the incentive was
large: while the departure rates for 1981 and for 1983 are virtually
identical, the 1982 rates were much higher. For example, the departure rate(52)
for 60 year olds was 17 percent in 1981 and 1983, but 29 percent in 1982. Of
those employed at age 50, 40 percent would still have been employed after age
60 based on the 1983 and 1983 departure rates. Only 27 percent would remain
after age 60 based on the 1982 rates, Even under the normal plan, only 10
percent of those employed at age 50 would still be employed at 65. Only 2
percent would remain until 65 with the special incentive.
c. An Option Value Model of Retirement.
The discussion above demonstrates the large incentive effects inherent in
the provisions of defined benefit pension plans and shows that these
inccntivcc have very substantial effects on fire retlre.Tel't Card other
departure) rates. An additional goal of research in this area is to predict
the effect on retirement rates of thanges in firm pension plan and SS
provisions.
i. The Model. Two basic approaches, in addition to leastsquares
regression, have been used in recent years to analyze retirement behavior.
The first is the method of estimation developed to analyze the choices of
Individuals who face discontinuous or kinked budget constraints, The central
feature of this method is a lifetime budget constraint analogous to the
standard labor-leisure budget constraint, but with annual hours of work
replaced by years of labor force participation, and annual earnings replaced
by cumulative life-time compensation. The optimal age of retirement is
determined by a utility function defined overyears of work (post-retirement
years of leisure) and cumulative compensation. A careful application of this
approach to retirement is by Burtless [19861, who analyzed the effects of
changes in Social Security benefits on retirement]8 While appealing inmany
'8An analogous model was usedby Venti and Wise [1984] to describe the
rent paid by low income families faced with discontinuous budgetconstraints.
Earlier papers that develop these techniques are Hausman and Wise[19801 and
gurtless and Hausman [1978)(53)
respects, this procedure has an important drawback. It implicitly assumes
that individuals know with certainty the opportunities -- likewage rates --
thatwill be available to them in the distant future. The hazard model is the
second approach. As implemented to date it is essentially a reduced-form
technique designed to capture the effects on retirement of movements in
variables such as Social Security wealth. Implementations of the hazard model
have not been as "forward looking" as the non-linear budget constraint
specifications.19On the other hand, unexpected shocks, like sudden changes
in earnings, enter the analysis ver1 naturally.
The Option Value Model as specified by Stock and Wise [1989] Incorporates
the advantages of both of the approaches described above. It allows updating
of information, as does the traditional hazard model, but also considers
potential compensation many years in the future, as does the nonlinear budget
20
constraint approach. The key ideas of the model can be summarized briefly.
19Thus in Hausman and Wise [1985]. for example, changes from the current
period to the next, in earnings, pension wealth, and the increment to pension
wealth, are allowed to affect the decision to retire in the next period, but
expectations of these values several years hence are not.
20Antecedents of the Stock and Wise model begin with Lazear and Moore
[3988], who argue that the option value of postponing retirement is the
appropriate variable to enter in a regression equation explaining retirement.
Indeed it was their work and analysis of military retirement rates by Phillips
and Wise [1987) that motivated Stock and Wise to pursue this approach. The
Stock and Wise model is close in spirit to the stochastic dynamic programming
model of Rust [1989]. Rust's [1989] model poses substantially greater
numerical complexity than the Stock and Wise model and has not yet been
estimated for retirement. In principle, he observes not only the individual's
retirement age, but subsequent consumption decisions as well. Thus his model
allows the individual to optimize over age of retirement and future
consumption jointly. The individual's decision is modeled as the solution to
a stochastic dynamic programming problem. As in the Stock and Wise case, the
individual's expectations are conditioned on current known variables such as
income. The idea is to recover the parameters of a utility function specified
in terms of these choice variables. In practice, though, he uses income to(54)
It is intended to capture an important empirical regularity, the
describe consumption (Rust (19881), with a value function similar to that of
Stock and Wise, specified in terms of income. To simplify the solution to the
dynamic programming problem in his model, he assumes that random unobserved
individual components are independent over time, whereas Stock and Wise allow
such terms (representing differences among individuals in healthstatus,
desire for leisure, and the like) to be correlated. In short. Rust has
described a solution to a more complicated choice than Stock and Wise, but
with uncorrelated errors, whereas the Stock and Wise model is a solution toa
less complex problem, but with corre1ated errors. A "dynamicProgramming"
model of employment behavior has also been proposed by Berkovec and Stern
[1988]. Berkovec and Stern's analysis is also in progress. They consider
transirons among three employment starps over time. To sflmp]ifv the o1utim
to their optir"ization problem, they assume that disturbance terms are
uncorrelated over time, except for an individual-specific random effect.
Their analysis is in terms of individual attributes like education,race,
health status, and age. Government benefits like SocialSecurity are not
explicitly modeled, whereas these benefits, as well as firm pension benefits
play the central role in the Stock and Wise analysis. Stock and Wise estimate
a discount, or weighting factor, whereas they obtain estimates of other
parameters conditional on an assumed discount rate. Age itself is used
explicitly to estimate retirement. Age is not a direct determinant of
retirement in the standard version of the Stock and Wise model. Thishas
important implications if the model is to be used to predict the effect of
changes in firm pension plan or SociaL Security provisions on retirement.
Neither Rust nor Berkovec and Stern, however, have informationon private
pension plan provisions, the focus of the Stock and Wise analysis. The
retirement decision rule proposed by Stock and Wise asan approximation to
individual behavior is much simpler than the dynamicprogramming rule. A
concomitant of this assumption is also much simpler econometricimplementation
than the burdensome calculations imposed by thedynamic programming rule.
These simplificatjons reduce the computationalrequirements substantially
while retaining the key forward-looking features of thedynamic programming
approach. Of course both of these models are theoretical abstractions.The
important consideration is which decision rule is the betterapproximation to
the calculations that govern actual individual behavior.The answer to this
question will have to await further analysis. Stock and Wise show thatthe
rule they assume predicts individual choiceswell; but the predictive
validities of the alternative decision rules have not beencompared(55)
irreversibility of the retirement decision. Although it is not uncommon to
work -.atleast part-time --after"retirement," it is rare to return to the
job from which one has retired. The model focuses on the opportunity cost of
retiring or, equivalently, on the value of retaining the option to retire at a
later date. It has two key aspects. The first is that a person will Continue
to work at any age if the option value of continuing work is greater than the
value of immediate retirement. In effect, the person compares the best of
expected future possibilities -.theoption value of continuing to work --
withthe value of retiring now. The second is that the individual reevaluates
this retirement decision as more information about future earnings -- andthus
future retirement benefits --becomesavailable with age. For example, a
decline in the wage between ages 56 and 57 will cause the individual to
reassess future wage earnings. and thus future pension benefits and Social
Security accrual as well. Thus retirement may seem more advantageous upon
reaching 57 than it was expected to be at age 56. Retirement occurs when the
value of continuing work falls below the value of retiring.
ii. Simulations of the Effect pf Chanees in Pension and SS Provisions.
To illustrate the potential to affect retirement behavior through changes in
pension and SS provisions, three simulations from Stock and Wise 11988] and
one from Lujnsdajne, Stock, and Wise [19891 are discussed here.
(a). Increase the Firm Early Retirement Ae from 55 to 60. The effect
of increasing the firm's early retirement age from 55 to 60, leaving other
provisions as they were, is shown in figure 17. Under the current plan 65
percent of those employed at 50 have left before age 60. Only 42 percent(56)
wouldhave left before age 60 if early retirement had been at 60 instead of
55. Only 13.6 percent of employees leave between 55 and 59 ifearly
retirement is at 60, whereas 45.5 percent leave between theseages under the
current system. On the other hand, because the early retirement "bonus" is
now farther in the future, more employees leave the firm between 50 and 54.
This is the result of the greater weight given to currentversus future
income. In short, many more workers would be employed between theages of 57
and 65 if the early retirement age were 60 instead of 55.
(b). Increase theSSEarly Retirement Reduction Factor. Social Security
benefitscan be taken beginning at age 62, but the curlent Social Scuriiy
rules include a benefit reduction of 5/9percentper month of retirement
beforeage 65.21 The simulated effect of increasing the reduction factor to 1
percent per month is shown in figure 18. It is clear that the effect of this
change is small relative to the effect of the change in the firmearly
retirement age. This is primarily because only a small fraction offirm
employees are still working at age 62, only 21 percent in the basecase. The
retirement rates of those still employed atage 62, however, are considerably
lower --about14 percent --withthe higher reduction factor. They are also
lower at 63.Still, the net result on the employment of persons covered
by
the firm's pension plan is negligible.
(c). Increase the SS Retirement Ages by One Year. Currentplans are to
increase the Social Security retirementage from 65 to 67 by 2027. To judge










































































































































the effect of such a change on workers with pension plans like the one in this
firm, Stock and Wise [19881simulatedthe effect of increasing the normal
retirement age from 65 to 66 and the early retirement age from 62 to 63. The
results are in figure 19. Again, the effect on the retirement rates of
persons in this firm is small. This is true even though the effect on the
annual retirement rates of 62 and 65 year. olds is substantial. The retirement
rate of 62.year-olds is reduced from 33.9 to 25.2 percent. The rate at 65 is
reduced from 28.6 to 25.1. But only a few workers remain in the firm to be
affected by these changes.
(d). The Effect of a Special Window Plan. During 1982, the firm had a
special retirement incentive program (a "window" plan) that provided up to one
years salary, in addition to regular retirement benefits, for employees who
retired in that year. The effects of this plan on the retirement behavior of
non.inanagerial office workers were simulated by Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise
[1989) and are shown in figure 20. For comparison, the figure shows
retirement rates in 1981 and then actual and simulated retirement rates in
1982. (Evidence on the effects of this plan is also shown in table 2 above.)
It is clear that the plan had a very large effect. Annual departure rates
were more than doubled for many age groups. In addition, the figure indicates
the extent to which the option value model was able to predict the effect of
this exogenous change in "retirement benefits."
IV.Summary.
The labor force participation of older Americans has declined
dramatically since the inception of Social Security and the tax inducement to
develop firm pension plans. Between 1937 and 1980 the participation rate of





































































































































































retirement rates in 1981 and 1982 vs.
retirement rates under the window

















60 62 64 66 68 60 62 64 66
Age(62)
decline. Even the rate for older women has declined since 1970.It seems
evident that the decline has resulted from the retirement income made possible
by these programs. The vast majority of the income of most retirees now comes
from pension and Social Security benefits. Most retirement age families have
almost no personal saving other than housing wealth. Yet the average income
of older families has increased dramatically in the past three decades,
possibly three fold between 1963 and 1978 alone. With reference to figure 1,
the retirement benefits curve has been raised. From the point of view of the
individual, the wealth associated with SS and firm pension benefits encourages
eatlli. retileineiiL.
Butit is not only the amount of the SS and pension wealth that matters.
Ilow it accumulates is also important. For example, if no benefits were
available until age 70, few employees would retire at age 55. If retirement
wealth accumulates rapidly between 55 and 60 and then starts to decline,
employees have an incentive to retire soon after age 60.In effect, the
reduction in the accumulation of retirement wealth is like a reduction in the
wage; both reduce the incentive for labor force participation. In fact, the
formulas determining firm pension benefits in particular tend toencourage
continued employment with the firm until some age -- oftenbetween 55 and 60
-- andprovide an incentive to leave the firm thereafter -- theannual
addition to retirement wealth is reduced or even negative. The addition to
retirement wealth after age 65 is almost always negative. The amount of the
retirement benefit is not increased enough for a person who retires oneyear
later to offset the fact that the benefit is received for oneyear less.
Thus even though individuals are living longer and even though a larger
fraction of the population is old, workers are leaving the labor force at(63)
younger and younger ages. The retired portion of the population is
increasing, the employed portion is declining. Whether by intent or by
happenstance, firm pension plan and Social Security provisions continue to
encourage this trend.References
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